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As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, Japan is widely
known for its use of participatory employment practices, involving em-
ployees in a substantive way in many ﬁrm decision-making processes. In-
formation sharing is one such participatory employment practice. Infor-
mation sharing and collaboration across business components have proved
to be important and valuable employment practices in Japanese ﬁrms, en-
abling workers with diﬀerent core responsibilities to interact more eﬀec-
tively. The value of such information sharing is particularly apparent in the
interaction between those who design production processes and those who
execute them. This paper is a case study of the value of information shar-
ing to the machine-tool industry, and how information sharing has con-
tributed to the success of the machine-tool industry in recent decades.
Until the mid-1970s, Japanese machine-tool manufacturers lagged far
behind their U.S. and German counterparts. The advent of computerized
numerical control (CNC) complex lathes or machining centers (MCs)1
drastically changed this situation (Finegold 1994; Finegold et al. 1994;
Fleischer 1997; or Kobayashi and Ohdaka 1995). Indeed, since 1982,
Japanese machine-tool manufacturers have led the industry, producing the
world’s largest (U.S. dollar) amount of machine tools.2 The following ex-
ternal and technological factors are normally credited with spurring the
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1. Most of these are ﬂexible, general-purpose machines.
2. In 1975, Japan occupied the fourth position, just after the former Soviet Union. The
United States occupied the ﬁrst position and the former West Germany the second.rapid development of the Japanese machine-tool industry since the late
1970s:3 (a) the extensive expansion of the Japanese automobile industry,
represented by Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, which in 1981 surpassed all
other countries in unit sales; (b) the “leap-forward” development of Japan-
ese mechatronics manufacturers, represented by Fanuc, Mitsubishi Elec-
tric, and Yaskawa Electric, who provided superior numerical control
devices and software; (c) the rapid development of precision-parts man-
ufacturers, such as NSK, NTN, or THK, who could supply bearings, ball
screws, and linear guideways; and (d) the basic development of foundry
engineering technology, represented by automatic control technology for
annealing, which eﬀectively removes casting stresses.
Needless to say, each of these factors has played a very important role in
the rise of the machine-tool industry. Chuma (1998) shows, however, that
there is a very important human-related factor: (e) the existence of a for-
mal simultaneous information-sharing system in which, even in the early
stages of fundamental machine design, development and design (D&D)
engineers can exchange opinions with production shop managers. Me-
chanical designers have multitudinous details to bear in mind when de-
signing complex, modern CNC machine tools. Except in very rare cases,
keeping track of everything is almost impossible, even for ﬁrst-rate design-
ers. Introducing a simultaneous information-sharing system linking highly
skilled machinists and D&D engineers at early stages of product develop-
ment will reduce lead time.4
The ever-increasing importance of information-sharing systems has
generated an increase in the premium paid to broadly skilled production
workers (ones with so-called “integrated skills”; Koike 1999). As machines
have become more and more complex both mechanically and electrically,
problem-solving skills have become more important for shortening lead
time in machine development. Here, “problem-solving skills” broadly
refers to the ability to anticipate and prevent problems with machines.
These skills require logical thinking and abundant experience with ma-
chine problems. Without this broad skill base, production workers and en-
gineers could not properly communicate and would therefore be unable to
anticipate and improvise solutions to the diversity of problems that invari-
ably arise in newly developed complex machines.5
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3. The strong role of the government, especially that played by the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) could be added to these four factors. However, there are con-
trasting views on this subject. Thus, we do not consider it. For more on this factor, see Fried-
man (1988), Holland (1992), Kobayashi and Ohdaka (1995), or Miwa (1998).
4. A similar point, based on a few case studies of new machine development processes used
by German, Italian, Japanese, and U.S. machine-tool manufacturers, can be found in several
papers in Jurgens (1999). However, the argument has never been statistically validated. More-
over, the cases proﬁled are not rich enough to introduce a speciﬁc machine development pro-
cess, as is done in this paper.
5. In this sense, contrary to Braverman’s (1978) naive conjecture, the advent of CNC com-
plex lathes, or MCs, through the mechatronics revolution is apt to induce upskilling rather
than deskilling of machine-tool manufacturers.The main purpose of this paper is to empirically test these conjectures
using information from basic ﬁeld research as well as a statistical analysis
of an original survey.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, an outline of
the research method is introduced. In section 3.3, I brieﬂy summarize the
external and technological factors that have favored Japanese machine-
tool manufacturers since 1970. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 are the main sections
of the paper. Section 3.4 introduces the gist of the simultaneous informa-
tion-sharing system for developing new machines, based on ﬁeld research.
Section 3.5 considers economic rationales for such a system and statisti-
cally conﬁrms my conjectures using an original survey. The ﬁnal section
summarizes the results.
3.2 The Research Method
I investigated twelve representative Japanese machine-tool manufactur-
ers from September 1996 to March 2000. Seven of these ﬁrms are large-
scale manufacturers, with more than 1,000 full-time employees. The other
ﬁve have less than 500 full-time employees.6 These ﬁrms can be classiﬁed
into four groups. The ﬁrst group produces high- or medium-class machines
that are mass-produced abroad as well as in Japan. The second group mass-
produces high- or medium-class machines that are only domestically pro-
duced and are largely exported to the United States or Europe. The third
group mass-produces low-cost machines that are only domestically pro-
duced and are largely exported to developing countries such as Asian
newly industrialized economies. The ﬁnal group consists of mother-
machine-type MCs with extraordinary tolerances that are only domesti-
cally produced. Thus, these ﬁrms are nicely varied for my research pur-
poses.7 In selecting these ﬁrms, I was advised by an industry specialist who
is actively involved in the top-rated machine-tool industry journal in
Japan, Seisan-zai Marketing Shi (Capital Goods Marketing Journal), which
is analogous to American Machinists in the United States.8
In addition to the ﬁeld research, I also conducted a survey of about 600
machine-tool and related ﬁrms in March 1998. These ﬁrms constitute the
population of ﬁrms in the machine-tool industry as identiﬁed by the Al-
manac of Oﬃce Automation, a publication issued annually by Seisan-zai
Marketing Shi. This almanac includes nearly all of the machine-tool man-
ufacturers in Japan. I asked a supervisor (such as a foreman) in the as-
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6. Although the results are not explicitly introduced here, I also visited an NC manufac-
turer, an LM guideway manufacturer, and three German machine-tool manufacturers.
7. I visited each shop ﬂoor or R&D section at least twice, and each interview lasted ap-
proximately two hours excluding time for factory tours. The details of this research are in
Chuma (1998).
8. I was introduced to this expert by a researcher from the Association of the Japanese Ma-
chine Tool Industry.sembly or machining shop of each company to ﬁll out the questionnaire.
The response rate was approximately 20 percent.
3.3 External and Technological Factors
In this section, I brieﬂy introduce external and technological factors that
have aided the development of the Japanese machine-tool industry since
1970. The human factors emphasized in this paper must be analyzed in the
context of these other factors. As illustrated in the statistical analysis that
follows, it is the combination of all of these factors that has induced the de-
velopment (albeit a discontinuous one) of this industry.
One crucial factor has been the rapid development of the Japanese auto
industry, represented by Toyota, Nissan, and Honda. About 60 percent of
domestic machine tools are demanded by auto and auto parts manufac-
turers. Moreover, if auto-related molding and electric equipment manu-
facturers are included, the corresponding percentage is much higher. The
link between the machine-tool and auto industries is reﬂected by the fact
that Japanese auto makers produced the world’s largest output in their in-
dustry in 1981, and Japanese machine-tool manufacturers accomplished
the same feat in 1982. Japanese machine-tool manufacturers are also con-
sidered expert at making CNC composite lathes, or MCs, whose prices
range from $100,000 to $500,000.
Another primary factor has been the development of the Japanese
mechatronics industry, represented by Fanuc, Mitsubishi Electric, and Ya-
skawa Electric. The numerical control (NC) technology owned by these
companies has long been considered very sophisticated in world markets,
particularly since the early 1980s (for details, see Finegold 1994 or Ko-
bayashi and Ohdaka 1995). Normally, machine-tool manufacturers col-
laborate with NC manufacturers in order to enhance the motion con-
trollability of their machines. This is one reason Japanese machine-tool
manufacturers continue to enjoy a substantial advantage in the advanced
controllability of high-speed and high-precision machines. Of course,
mechatronics manufacturers must be compensated for their contributions.
Indeed, my ﬁeld research suggests that 30 to 40 percent of total machine-
tool costs are spent in order to utilize this high NC technology (including
both software and hardware), regardless of whether the technology was de-
veloped by the machine-tool manufacturers themselves.9
A third important factor has been the development of the Japanese bear-
ing, ball screw, and guideway manufacturing industries, represented by
NSK, NTN, and THK. As is the case for NC technology, these high-
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9. Such heavy reliance on the mechatronics industry has been interpreted by many Japan-
ese machine-tool manufacturers as an industry crisis, and the demand for open NC interfaces
has greatly increased.precision parts are typically speciﬁc to individual machine-tool manufac-
turers. Therefore, a long-term relationship between these parts suppliers
and machine-tool manufacturers is again desirable.10 In other words, hav-
ing easy access to high-precision parts manufacturers is quite beneﬁcial
to machine-tool manufacturers. One of the most inﬂuential of the high-
precision parts is the linear motion guideway (LM guide), which was in-
vented by THK about twenty-ﬁve years ago. Before the LM guide, slide
guideways that required highly advanced hand-scraping skills11 in order to
guarantee a micron level of precision were quite common. The LM guide,
however, signiﬁcantly reduced the need for hand scraping without sacriﬁc-
ing the controllability of machines.12 This is reﬂected in the fact that most
of the machine-tool manufacturers I visited claimed that their payments to
parts manufacturers constitute 10 to 20 percent of their total costs.
The fourth factor has been the rapid development of foundry engineer-
ing as represented by the automatic control technology for annealing to
promptly remove casting stresses. In fact, this technology was invented
about twenty years ago. In my ﬁeld research, many engineers emphasized
the fact that high-quality iron castings became cheaper due to the spread
of annealing furnaces equipped with advanced automatic process con-
trol technology. The modern casting process uses open-arc or annealing
furnaces. It requires precision in all aspects of the production process, in-
cluding time, temperature, and ingredients, and so it must be automatically
controlled in order to produce high-quality products. Many Japanese ma-
chinery manufacturers have invented very precise controlling technologies.
Before these innovations, manufacturers placed iron castings around their
factories for (natural) aging. In fact, one reason German and Swiss ma-
chine-tool manufacturers of the pre-innovation era were very proud of the
stability of their high-precision machines was that they used high-quality
iron castings that had undergone long-term aging. Nowadays, similar ag-
ing eﬀects can easily be achieved by three to six hours of stress relief an-
nealing inside a furnace of 500 to 550 degrees centigrade (Monma 1997).
Many of the research and development (R&D) engineers I interviewed
mentioned that the availability of high-quality iron castings is no longer a
bottleneck in the production of high-quality machines.
3.4 Simultaneous Information Sharing during the Development Process
In this section we examine the types of simultaneous information sharing
that take place in the Japanese machine-tool industry. We use manufacturer
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10. Several representative machine-tool manufacturers produce their own ball screws.
11. Hand-scraping skills are among the most diﬃcult craft-type skills, even though the mo-
tion is seemingly repetitive and physically demanding.
12. It is sometimes claimed that slide guideways are still much better than LM guides for
maintaining micron or submicron levels of machine precision for heavy-duty jobs (Bates 1999).B, a leading Japanese machine-tool manufacturer, as an example of how
new machine ideas are developed and what kind of information sharing
takes place when a ﬁrm produces experimental machines in anticipation of
commercial production. Similar machine development processes have been
introduced in most of the twelve machine-tool manufacturers I investigated.
Before continuing, however, we need to distinguish among three types
of drawings: prototype drawings, conceptual drawings, and component
drawings. Prototype drawings outline the basic ideas for a potential new
machine.13 Conceptual drawings break the prototype drawings down into
elaborately detailed sections. Conceptual drawings are sometimes called
“drawings for assembly.” After the conceptual drawings are complete, it is
possible to make component drawings, which indicate the exact form and
size of each part.14 The recent development of computer-aided design
(CAD) makes it possible to use the conceptual ﬁgures to calculate such
things as the strength of the machine, the frequency of vibrations, and the
thermal transformations that occur when the machine is heated up.
3.4.1 Examples of Leading Newly Developed Machines
We use the MC FF63S (not the real name) as an example of a leading
machine at manufacturer B. This machine is characterized by a highly re-
spected trade journal as a horizontal machining center “developed based
on both the high-speed and high-precision technology that applies to high-
level heat-control systems.” More concretely, it can rapidly and precisely
process medium- or large-sized output; its work-feeding speed reaches 30
meters per minute when special square-angled slide guideways are used.
The development designer at manufacturer B, whom I interviewed, said
that the main objective of this machine was to reduce total costs by 30 per-
cent over the previous prototype, and that it actually reduces the pro-
cessing time by 35 percent for certain auto parts manufacturers. This MC
has sold well, especially in the United States.
3.4.2 The Process of Machine Development
Manufacturer B uses a rolling ﬁve-year development plan that lists each
type of machine and its expected year of completion. This plan is closely
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13. In these drawings, users’ needs, competitors’ machine speciﬁcations, and relevant con-
cepts for strategically important components are clariﬁed. Details are given on the forms and
structures of ball screws and guideways, as well as the main spindle, which make it possible to
attain the targeted cutting speed and precision. Designers try to simulate the main objectives
in these drawings.
14. In the case of main spindle units, the corresponding conceptual drawings consist of a
three-dimensional ﬁgure and two-dimensional drawings that indicate the placement of bear-
ings, springs, spacers, and so on. In these drawings, exact sizes, intervals between bearings,
torque for screwing, and the like are given. The drawing for each main spindle, bearing,
spacer, and so forth is called a component ﬁgure. Therefore, whether a drawing is a compo-
nent or conceptual drawing depends to some extent on the mechanism of each machine.aligned with the fundamental management plan. It clearly stipulates mar-
ket conditions based on sales information, user feedback, related litera-
ture, newspapers, and other sources. A plan with a concrete timetable is
created for each type of machine, such as grinding machines, machining
centers, and made-to-order machines. The machines are principally
planned by members of the machine-tool planning sections in the ma-
chine-tool and mechatronics divisions. Most of these planners were origi-
nally in the development and design division. In addition, participants
from other departments, such as sales, production planning, machining
and assembling, purchasing, quality control, and R&D give input. The
FF63S was developed mainly in response to users’ feedback.
3.4.3 Information Sharing in the Design Review 1
The development of the machining center FF63S was initiated in De-
cember 1994, when the machine was added to the ﬁve-year development
plan. It was completed in 1995. Usually, a project manager is selected as
soon as it is decided that a machine is to be developed. The manager im-
mediately starts to make a commodity design plan, which veriﬁes such
strategic details as sales points, main speciﬁcation comparisons with simi-
lar machines made by competitors, sales and proﬁt plans, and users’ cur-
rent and future demands. In the case of FF63S, the project team studied
sales information from the previous prototype machine, FF60B. They con-
sidered examples of inquiries about FF60B, an analysis of the main rea-
sons why these speciﬁc inquiries did or did not lead to actual orders, and
feedback from users after the sale. Section or department heads of the
aforementioned departments typically join in making the commodity de-
sign plan.
After the commodity design plan has been successfully completed, the
project manager15and his or her subordinates create a product design plan,
which usually takes about two months. This plan includes the machine’s
main development objective, mechanical speciﬁcations, costs, expected
development time, selling points, expected diﬃculties, quality target, de-
sign quality, method of product maintenance, and so on. In addition, it
stipulates previously developed parts that are to be used. For example, a
plan might include a comment such as “some parts of the main spindle of
the previous machine can be used as they are.” Moreover, in going from the
commodity design plan to the product design plan, it is quite common to
reevaluate the relevance of the users’ development requests, which had
been submitted early in the commodity design phase. Again, planning par-
ticipants from various departments, especially department heads, provide
input for revisions of the product design plan. For example, representatives
from the machinists’ division theorize on how they may or may not be able
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15. I interviewed the project manager of FF63S himself.to overcome the diﬃculties speciﬁed in the product design plan, and rep-
resentatives from purchasing comment on the expected costs.
At manufacturer B, the meeting to discuss the product design plan pro-
posed by the project manager is called the DR1 (design review 1). The ba-
sic ideas for the drawings (including the prototype drawings) are all de-
cided upon in the DR1, and they are rarely modiﬁed thereafter. During the
DR1 for the FF63S, the project chief was asked to clarify the precision and
eﬃciency of the machine if used on the special projects of the speciﬁc users
for whom the FF63S was being produced.
3.4.4 Information Sharing in the Design Review 2
If the product design plan passes the DR1, conceptual drawings are
made based on the commodity design plan. The relevance of these draw-
ings is discussed in the design review 2 (DR2). At this stage, even the exte-
rior face of the machine is sketched in detail. In other words, the concep-
tual drawings are quite complicated and precise. The section managers of
the sales, production planning, machining and assembling, purchasing,
quality control department, and R&D departments participate in the
DR2. For example, representatives from the assembly shop may comment
on the feasibility of the tolerances indicated in the drawings.
In order to estimate the total costs of the new machine, the conceptual
drawings specify the man-hours needed to build the machine and the cor-
responding total and unit labor costs. In addition, materials costs, energy
costs, and the costs of using the company’s facilities are speciﬁed. Then,
representatives from the machining and assembly shops voice their opin-
ions on the accuracy of the proposed man-hours, and sometimes change
the estimates. Of course, it is desirable for assembly workers and machin-
ists to secure suﬃcient time in which to complete their assigned tasks. In-
deed, the man-hours determined in the DR2 become the standard against
which actual man-hours are measured in the commercial production
phase. However, since management insists on optimal cost-eﬃciency, the
man-hours needed for assembly or machining must be as small as possible.
It is in the DR2 that such adjustments are made. I should note that, for
most projects, there is a general consensus among the planning partici-
pants regarding required man-hours for assembly or machining, based on
past job experience or working records. Lastly, when tolerances required
by the conceptual drawings exceed the level attainable using existing hard-
ware, representatives from the machining shops are likely to request per-
mission to purchase new hardware.
3.4.5 Information Sharing in the Design Review 3
After the conceptual design is accepted in the DR2, work on various
component drawings begins immediately. Only drawings of important
parts (e.g., the main spindle) that have been drastically changed from the
88 Hiroyuki Chumaprevious prototype are reviewed in the design review 3 (DR3). The design-
ers in charge decide whether or not a drawing needs to be reviewed. I
should note here that reviewers from all departments utilize the same set of
drawings during all the design reviews, regardless of aﬃliation. In other
words, representative reviewers from sales, services, and production shops
all review every DR3 drawing. Their opinions are also applied to the DR1
and DR2 drawings. For example, in the DR3, representatives from the as-
sembly shop may claim that the assembly tasks depicted in a certain draw-
ing are quite diﬃcult and must be changed. Or representatives from the
machining shop may claim that the shape of the machine as depicted in the
drawings requires too many man-hours and so ought to be changed. In this
way, professionals from various departments exchange opinions about the
feasibility and reliability of the proposed machine.
3.4.6 Information Sharing during Experimental Production
After the DR3, experimental production begins. This used to be done by
assembly workers and machinists on the shop ﬂoor. Recently, however,
ﬁrms have begun to form special teams on a trial basis that specialize in ex-
perimental production. Standard working manuals are also written in this
phase. To create these manuals, factory engineers conduct time studies us-
ing stopwatches or by interviewing the workers in charge in order to deter-
mine the standard working time for each task. However, the factory engi-
neers do not unilaterally determine standard working time. Rather, it is
determined by a combination of discussion and this evidence. Work im-
provement proposals are also written at this stage. In the case of the
FF63S, about a year passed between the proposal of the commodity design
plan and the completion of the ﬁrst experimental machine. Five months
passed between the beginning of experimental production and the com-
pletion of test cutting.
Normally, only one or two experimental machines are produced. After
that, about ten commercial machines are produced for speciﬁc users. These
twelve machines are used in part to uncover and eliminate bugs. For ex-
ample, if cut chips tend to block eﬃcient cutting, the chip-handling system
is redesigned. If some part of the machine is not strong enough, the design
ﬂaw will be corrected. In the case of the FF63S, a new technology was used
that automatically controls the thermal expansion expected to occur
around the main spindle. However, this control system did not work reli-
ably  in the experimental production stage, and several technological
breakthroughs were needed to ﬁx it.
It is not uncommon for mechanical designers to try to immediately cor-
rect machine defects in the assembly shops. They are apt to stay in the
shops during the whole of experimental production. Project leaders or
chief design managers sometimes instruct their subordinates to work
alongside the assembly workers while they are assembling the machine.
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because the ambiguity can be clariﬁed immediately. The project manager
of the FF63S explained,
Without experience, it is very diﬃcult to understand the gist of machine-
tool mechanics. It can be quite dangerous to design machines without
knowing how each machine is processed and assembled in the shop. To
eﬀectively design new machines and machine parts, mechanical design-
ers have to have an understanding of the skill level of the assemblymen
and machinists as well as the production capacity and ﬁnishing ability of
company-owned facilities.
3.5 The Necessity for Simultaneous Information Sharing
3.5.1 Intuition Acquired from Field Research
The simultaneous information-sharing system linking mechanical de-
signers and production workers has been broadly utilized and institution-
alized by all of the machine-tool manufacturers we investigated. However,
many have begun to criticize it, saying that the Japanese practice of re-
garding the common consensus as ﬁrst best is outdated. However, the head
of the technology department of manufacturer B pointed out the following
very interesting fact:
It is an established fact that we think highly of simultaneous information
sharing among our various departments and divisions. This practice has
been well established for about ten years—since the so-called TQC be-
gan to be widely practiced. Certainly, people shared a sense of family
even before then, and consensus was important in various aspects of our
production process. The current, rather egalitarian information-sharing
system, however, was established in the 1980s, at which point certain
types of sectionalism were almost wiped out and collaboration started
to play a more important role. Twenty or thirty years ago, the technol-
ogy department unilaterally presided over the production department.
In a sense, engineers in the technology department encouraged produc-
tion workers to do a good job in a paternalistic way. Also, they had the
arrogance to say that the production workers had only to faithfully fol-
low their instructions in order to produce good machines. However, such
a unilateral relationship could not produce good products. As a result,
the current design review system was introduced, based on the idea that,
because only assembly and machining shops produce actual products,
machine drawings must respect the shops’ ways of doing things and take
into account the various shops’ constraints.
Total quality control (TQC) practices were well established by the 1960s
in the Japanese automobile and household appliance industries (Udagawa
et al. 1995). They have been utilized well into the 1980s, at least for manu-
facturer B (see the foregoing quotation). If this were true for all other
90 Hiroyuki Chumamachine-tool manufacturers, we could claim, contrary to the generally ac-
cepted notion, that the simultaneous information-sharing system linking
production workers and engineers was established only recently. In other
words, the system is not indigenous to Japan, but came into existence as the
eﬃcient production system of the period of rapid globalization in the
1980s. Indeed, our survey revealed the following: About 62 percent of ma-
chine-tool manufacturers16 with close information sharing between me-
chanical designers and production workers answered that their system was
initiated after 1980. This number increases to 74 percent when we include
manufacturers who reported initiating their systems after 1970.
Why was the current egalitarian system of information sharing intro-
duced fairly recently? The following comments from the mechanical de-
signers of one of the largest machine-tool manufacturers in the industry
help to answer this question:
When traditional non-NC lathes or milling machines used to be pro-
duced, mechanical designers were very overconﬁdent relative to the cur-
rent standard. This was because they could theorize much of how these
non-NC machines were built. However, their ability to do this gradually
diminished as the machines became multifunctional, as in the case of
machining centers or complex lathes, and equipped with CNC. This was
reinforced by the advent of high-speed and high-precision machines
equipped with ATC (auto tool changer) and APC (auto pallet changer).
In the case of such complex machines, designers must take many factors
into account beforehand in order to design a good machine. However,
except in very rare cases, this is almost impossible. This is when the pres-
ent simultaneous and egalitarian information-sharing system among
our departments and divisions started to play an important role. Com-
pared with the skills of machinists, the skills of ﬁrst-rate assemblymen
are primarily based on experience with a large number of fundamental
laws. These skills are quite durable, even in the face of rapid technologi-
cal development. As a result, assembly shops have become increasingly
powerful.
Many engineers in the machine-tool manufacturing ﬁrms I investigated
support the above statements. It is very interesting to note that, in contrast
to automobile or household appliance manufacturers, none of the investi-
gated machine-tool manufacturers have production or factory engineering
sections (for assembly shops). These sections normally standardize assem-
bling processes, manage production processes, or serve as an interface be-
tween production workers and R&D engineers or designers. Their absence
underscores the necessity for close and simultaneous information sharing
during the development process.17
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16. Only 7 percent say they have no such close information-sharing system.
17. Only one of the machine-tool manufacturers I visited had such a section. However,
upon further investigation, this section was found not to play the same role as an ordinary
production engineering section.Lastly, some people maintain that information sharing between produc-
tion workers and engineers was practiced even in the prewar period. The
following examples support this claim. According to Tokyo Gas Electric
(now Hitachi Fine Machinery),
The ﬁrst stage of production management is design. In 1933, when we
were still in a depression, the company employed 2 to 3 university grad-
uates as designers of milling machines in a particular series. We had es-
tablished a system in which the designers were responsible for all defects
in the machines, so that it was quite troublesome when machines could
not be produced as designed. All members of the production team
thought hard about any problems that arose, and tried to improve the
machines. It was not rare for young designers to take special on-the-job
lessons in machining or assembly from skilled workers. Such an envi-
ronment created excellent designers. (Miyazaki 1997)
According to Seiko,
Around the last half of the 1920s, university graduates in the engineer-
ing section responsible for design who had insuﬃcient knowledge of
manufacturing technology were grouped together with assembly work-
ers who had strong project-speciﬁc skills but were weak in theoretical
understanding. They developed new products together. In this process,
new products were revised again and again by both designers and skilled
workers. They were put into commercial production only when no more
defects could be found by any of the group’s members. The close rela-
tionship between designers and skilled workers at that time reminds us
of the current-style production process. (Odaka 1993, 151)
To be sure, it can be surmised from these statements that a form of mu-
tual understanding between engineers and production workers played an
important role in manufacturing even in the prewar period. However, Ya-
mashita (1999) also introduces evidence collected from interviews with
several former Tokyo Gas Electric engineers that suggests that even infor-
mal communication between production workers and engineers was quite
rare in the prewar Tokyo Gas Electric, in direct contradiction to the above
example. Thus, it is doubtful that the current type of simultaneous infor-
mation system existed in the prewar period.18
3.5.2 Statistical Analysis
As indicated in the previous section, the advent of CNC complex lathes
or MCs increased the need for simultaneous information sharing between
production workers and design and development engineers. To show this
statistically, we estimate a probit equation (1) allowing for heteroskedas-
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18. Prewar evidence of informal and rather sporadic information sharing in Nihon Denki
(the current NEC), Shibaura Seisaku-sho (the current Toshiba), and Mitsubishi Electric (a
part of the former Mitsubishi Heavy Industry) is introduced in Sasaki (1998).ticity. In this equation, the dependent dummy variable d_sinfo1 takes on a
value of one if the ﬁrm answered “yes” to the following question: “Does
your company (or factory) have a formal design review system in which,
even in the early states of machine development, both R&D (or D&D) en-
gineers and production workers simultaneously and directly exchange
opinions?”
In the sample of 108 respondents, 67 percent answered “yes.” In addition
to this dependent variable (d_sinfo1), we also use two other dependent
variables: d_sinfo2 and d_sinfo3. The dummy variable d_sinfo2 takes on a
value of one if d_sinfo = 1 and the ﬁrm introduced this information-
sharing system in 1980 or later. The dummy variable d_sinfo3 takes on a
value of one if d_sinfo1 = 1 and the system was introduced in 1970 or later.
These additional variables are utilized because the ﬁeld research suggests
that information-sharing systems were mainly introduced after 1980. In-
deed, 41 percent of ﬁrms are in the d_sinfo2 = 1 sample and 50 percent are
in the d_sinfo3 = 1 sample, so a large number of manufacturers introduced
the system after 1980. Description of the independent variables (Xi) used
are provided in the appendix.
(1) d_sinfo1   1 if  0  ∑
i n
i 1
 iXi   ε   0 ;   0 otherwise for j   1, 2, 3
where  i= coeﬃcients, Xi= independent variables (i= 1, 2, . . . n), ε  (0,
1) (the standard normal distribution).
The estimation results are shown in tables 3.1 through 3.3. Generally
speaking, the most favorable results employ the dependent variable
d_sinfo2, the next most favorable use d_sinfo3, and the least favorable use
d_sinfo1. This indicates that the need for simultaneous information shar-
ing between production workers and design and development engineers
has increased, especially since 1980. This is also the period during which
Japanese machine-tool manufacturers have consistently maintained the
world’s largest machine-tool production.
According to table 3.1, d_sinfo1 is positively correlated with the ex-
planatory variables d_integ, d_ptime and d_TQC, all of whose coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The dummy variable d_integ takes
on a value of one if the manufacturer answered “Yes” to the question:
“In training your regular assemblymen, do you basically make them gain
broad skills and know-how for both main- and parts-assembling pro-
cesses?” The dummy variable d_ptime indicates that the sampled manu-
facturer employs nonregular employees such as part-timers. The dummy
variable d_TQC that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm has introduced TQC
activities. The negatively correlated variables, signiﬁcant at the same level,
are OVERSEAS and d_pswar. The dummy variable OVERSEAS indicates
that the ﬁrm has directly produced machines overseas using a production
process that is quite diﬀerent from that used for domestic production. The
Shadow Value of Simultaneous Information Sharing 93variable d_pswar is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the
manufacturer was founded after World War II (WWII).
The result that d_integ positively and signiﬁcantly increases the proba-
bility of introducing a simultaneous information-sharing system is ex-
pected a priori because, other things being equal, it suggests that assembly
workers are broadly skilled. The positive and signiﬁcant impact of d_TQC
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Table 3.1 The Eﬀects of Firm Characteristics on the Probability of Adoption of a




d_sinfo1 Coeﬃcient Standard Error zP   z (1) (2) dP/dx
_cons* –1.42 0.81 –1.75 0.08 –3.01 0.17 —
method 0.47 0.35 1.33 0.19 –0.22 1.16 0.1
d_integ*** 1.14 0.42 2.73 0.01 0.32 1.95 0.4
d_early** 0.72 0.32 2.20 0.03 0.08 1.35 0.2
d_mfunc* 1.41 0.83 1.70 0.09 –0.22 3.04 0.3
d_mfunc2 0.15 0.76 0.20 0.84 –1.34 1.63 0.0
d_scrape** 1.11 0.56 1.98 0.05 0.01 2.21 0.3
d_tshoot** 1.10 0.47 2.35 0.02 0.18 2.01 0.4
skillrat –0.14 0.23 –0.61 0.54 –0.58 0.30 (0.0)
d_ptime*** 0.94 0.36 2.62 0.01 0.24 1.65 0.3
d_TQC*** 0.87 0.32 2.73 0.01 0.25 1.49 0.3
d_experi 0.41 0.40 1.03 0.30 –0.37 1.18 0.1
overseas*** –1.69 0.47 –3.61 0.00 –2.61 –0.78 (0.6)
d_pubedu 0.18 0.39 0.45 0.65 –0.59 0.95 0.1
d_intwar –0.77 0.56 –1.37 0.17 –1.87 0.33 (0.3)
d_pstwar*** –1.44 0.52 –2.76 0.01 –2.47 –0.42 (0.4)
d_lathe 0.07 0.43 0.16 0.87 –0.78 0.91 0.0
d_MC –0.09 0.42 –0.20 0.84 –0.92 0.75 (0.0)
d_Drill –0.94 0.75 –1.25 0.21 –2.41 0.53 (0.3)
d_Boring 0.15 0.83 0.18 0.86 –1.49 1.78 0.0
d_GeaGrd* 0.69 0.36 1.92 0.06 –0.02 1.40 0.2
d_IND –0.04 0.38 –0.10 0.92 –0.78 0.71 (0.0)
d_Misc –0.33 0.32 –1.03 0.30 –0.96 0.30 (0.1)
d_spoint –0.55 0.37 –1.50 0.13 –1.27 0.17 (0.2)
d_spoint2 –0.07 0.30 –0.25 0.81 –0.66 0.51 (0.0)




Notes: Probit estimates of equation (1) with robust standard errors. Obs. P(d_sinfo1 = 1) = 0.67; pred.
P(d_sinfo1 = 1) = 0.75 (at x-bar). Boldface indicates that the variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
***P   .01.
**P   .05.
*P   .10.is also consistent with my conjectures. As for the OVERSEAS dummy, my
ﬁeld research suggests that most machine-tool manufacturers involved in
overseas production (12 percent of the sample) mass-produce machine-
tools based on expected demand. Compared with user-speciﬁc machines,
mass-produced machines are less demanding of assembling and machining
skills. Thus, OVERSEAS has a negative and signiﬁcant impact. In addi-
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Table 3.2 The Eﬀects of Firm Characteristics on the Probability of Adoption of a




d_sinfo2 Coeﬃcient Standard Error zP   z (1) (2) dP/dx
_cons*** –3.25 1.01 –3.23 0.00 –5.23 –1.28 —
method*** 1.42 0.51 2.81 0.01 0.43 2.41 0.5
d_integ* 0.94 0.49 1.90 0.06 –0.03 1.90 0.3
d_early** 0.87 0.42 2.08 0.04 0.05 1.69 0.3
d_mfunc*** 2.36 0.86 2.75 0.01 0.67 4.04 0.7
d_mfunc2 0.58 0.82 0.71 0.48 –1.03 2.19 0.2
d_scrape*** 1.94 0.64 3.03 0.00 0.68 3.19 0.6
d_tshoot*** 1.97 0.59 3.31 0.00 0.80 3.13 0.6
skillrat –0.15 0.27 –0.55 0.59 –0.67 0.38 (0.1)
d_ptime*** 1.97 0.46 4.24 0.00 1.06 2.87 0.7
d_TQC*** 1.07 0.41 2.62 0.01 0.27 1.87 0.4
d_experi*** 1.40 0.51 2.77 0.01 0.41 2.39 0.4
overseas*** –2.65 0.72 –3.70 0.00 –4.06 –1.25 (0.5)
d_pubedu*** 1.92 0.50 3.82 0.00 0.94 2.91 0.6
d_intwar*** –4.24 0.83 –5.10 0.00 –5.87 –2.61 (0.7)
d_pstwar*** –2.69 0.78 –3.46 0.00 –4.21 –1.16 (0.8)
d_lathe*** 1.52 0.53 2.86 0.00 0.48 2.56 0.6
d_MC* 1.22 0.70 1.74 0.08 –0.16 2.61 0.5
d_Drill** –2.08 0.85 –2.45 0.02 –3.76 –0.41 (0.5)
d_Boring –1.22 0.79 –1.54 0.13 –2.77 0.34 (0.3)
d_GeaGrd 0.48 0.49 0.98 0.33 –0.47 1.43 0.2
d_IND 0.46 0.49 0.95 0.34 –0.49 1.42 0.2
d_Misc*** –2.00 0.45 –4.43 0.00 –2.88 –1.11 (0.6)
d_spoint*** –1.35 0.45 –3.02 0.00 –2.22 –0.47 (0.4)
d_spoint2 –0.46 0.38 –1.21 0.23 –1.20 0.28 (0.2)




Notes: Probit estimates of equation (1) with robust standard errors. Obs. P(d_sinfo1 = 1) = 0.41; pred.
P(d_sinfo1 = 1) = 0.37 (at x-bar). Boldface indicates that the variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
***P   .01.
**P   .05.
*P   .10.tion, ﬁrms founded after WWII are more apt to specialize in mass-
produced machines than are the more established ﬁrms. This is why
d_pswar has as signiﬁcant and negative an impact as OVERSEAS. I do
now know why d_ptime has a signiﬁcant, positive impact. However, my
ﬁeld research yields no deﬁnitive evidence that mass-producers use more
nonregular workers. Accordingly, it is possible for d_ptime to a priori have
either a positive or negative impact.
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Table 3.3 The Eﬀects of Firm Characteristics on the Probability of Adoption of a




d_sinfo3 Coeﬃcient Standard Error zP   z (1) (2) dP/dx
_cons* –1.43 0.85 –1.68 0.09 –3.09 0.24 —
method 0.47 0.37 1.26 0.21 –0.26 1.20 0.2
d_integ*** 1.28 0.48 2.68 0.01 0.35 2.22 0.5
d_early** 0.84 0.37 2.28 0.02 0.12 1.56 0.3
d_mfunc 0.48 0.60 0.81 0.42 –0.68 1.65 0.2
d_mfunc2 0.09 0.75 0.12 0.90 –1.37 1.56 0.0
d_scrape*** 1.10 0.57 1.93 0.05 –0.02 2.22 0.4
d_tshoot 0.29 0.50 0.58 0.56 –0.68 1.26 0.1
skillrat –0.14 0.22 –0.63 0.53 –0.58 0.30 (0.1)
d_ptime*** 1.58 0.40 3.94 0.00 0.80 2.37 0.6
d_TQC** 0.74 0.36 2.08 0.04 0.04 1.44 0.3
d_experi* 0.69 0.38 1.80 0.07 –0.06 1.44 0.3
overseas*** –1.84 0.49 –3.75 0.00 –2.81 –0.88 (0.6)
d_pubedu*** 1.29 0.46 2.78 0.01 0.38 2.19 0.4
d_intwar*** –3.07 0.73 –4.20 0.00 –4.51 –1.64 (0.8)
d_pstwar*** –2.07 0.65 –3.20 0.00 –3.34 –0.80 (0.7)
d_lathe** 1.06 0.47 2.25 0.02 0.14 1.98 0.4
d_MC** 1.11 0.50 2.24 0.03 0.14 2.09 0.4
d_Drill –1.17 0.79 –1.47 0.14 –2.72 0.39 (0.4)
d_Boring** –1.45 0.74 –1.96 0.05 –2.91 0.00 (0.5)
d_GeaGrd 0.10 0.37 0.26 0.79 –0.62 0.81 0.0
d_IND 0.47 0.37 1.25 0.21 –0.27 1.20 0.2
d_Misc*** –1.05 0.35 –3.03 0.00 –1.73 –0.37 (0.4)
d_spoint –0.64 0.42 –1.51 0.13 –1.47 0.19 (0.3)
d_spoint2 –0.35 0.33 –1.04 0.30 –1.00 0.31 (0.1)




Notes: Probit estimates of equation (1) with robust standard errors. Obs. P(d_sinfo1 = 1) = 0.50; pred.
P(d_sinfo1 = 1) = 0.56 (at x-bar). Boldface indicates that the variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
***P   .01.
**P   .05.
*P   .10.There are additional variables in table 3.1 that are signiﬁcant at the 5 per-
cent level. These are d_early, d_scrape, and d_tshoot. The dummy variable
d_early takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm answered “yes” to the following
question: “In order to foster your prospective leaders, are you concerned
about putting talented assemblymen in charge of a wider range of work be-
ginning in the early stages of their careers, so that they can gain integrated
skills?” The dummy variable d_scrape implies that the most advanced job
for assemblyworkers in the ﬁrm is hand scraping, which is required to at-
tain the static or dynamic precision called for by the drawings. The dummy
variable d_tshoot indicates that the most advanced job for assemblywork-
ers in the ﬁrm is that of troubleshooting in the shops (diagnosing and cor-
recting both new and previously encountered bugs). All three of these vari-
ables indicate that the assemblyworkers in the ﬁrm are highly skilled. They
signiﬁcantly enhance the need for simultaneous information sharing be-
tween production workers and design and development engineers.
We note here that there are two or three other variables that are signiﬁ-
cant at the 10 percent level. Their signiﬁcance, however, is highly depen-
dent on the total sample size, so it is dangerous to draw conclusions based
on these data alone. The highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are also signiﬁcant
in tables 3.2 and 3.3, whereas the less signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are not always
robust to changes in the dependent variable.
As previously mentioned, the ﬁeld research suggests that the need for si-
multaneous information sharing between production workers and design
and development engineers has increased since the late 1970s. The fact that
the number of signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent or 5 percent level) variables
jumps appreciably in tables 3.2 and 3.3 supports this suggestion.19 It is es-
pecially apparent in table 3.2 for the dependent variable d_sinfo2, which
takes on a value of 1 if d_sinfo1 = 1 and the system was introduced in 1980
or later. Additional variables with positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in
tables 3.2 and 3.3 are d_method, d_mfunc, d_experi, d_pubedu, d_lathe,
d_MC, and scale100. The variables d_intwar, d_Drill, d_Misc, and
d_spoint all have negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
The dummy variable d_method takes on a value of 1 if the total assembly
method of high-speed/high-accuracy machines diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
that of other machines. The dummy variable d_mfunc indicates that the
ﬁrm tries to make its machinists multifunctional, since being responsible
for many machines at once might allow them to troubleshoot more eﬀec-
tively. The variable d_experi indicates that, compared to machining skills,
assembling skills in a ﬁrm are apt to withstand rapid technological inno-
vation.20 The dummy variable d_pubedu indicates that the ﬁrm requires
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19. The signiﬁcance of d_integ drops a little, but it is still signiﬁcant at the 6 percent level.
20. Actually, about 80 percent of the manufacturers interviewed for my survey reported
that assembling skills are more likely to be internalized in a speciﬁc person than machining
skills. Moreover, compared with machining skills, assembling skills are more dependent on
many experienced laws.public trade skill licenses for promotion. If the ﬁrm produces (CNC)
lathes, the dummy variable d_lathe takes on a value of 1. If the ﬁrm pro-
duces machining centers, drilling machines, or miscellaneous machines,
the dummy variables d_MC, d_Drill, and d_Misc respectively take on a
value of 1. The dummy variable scale100 indicates that the ﬁrm has more
than 100 full-time employees. The dummy variable d_intwar indicates that
the ﬁrm was founded during the interwar period. Finally, the dummy vari-
able d_spoint indicates that the ﬁrm’s sales point is “low price.”
The variable d_method is a proxy for whether the ﬁrm has highly skilled
assemblyworkers; if the ﬁrm produces high-speed and high-precision ma-
chines, such workers are necessary. Thus, the positive and signiﬁcant co-
eﬃcient on d_method is consistent with a priori expectations. The variable
d_mfunc implies that the machinists have broad skills. Hence, its signiﬁ-
cant and positive impact is also acceptable. The same interpretation is ap-
plicable to the coeﬃcient on the variable d_experi because assembling
skills rely heavily on rules of thumb. Insights from the ﬁeld research are
helpful in interpreting the signiﬁcant positive impact of the variable
d_pubedu. Machine-tool manufacturers that recommend acquiring public
trade skill licenses also make the licenses mandatory for promotion in or-
der to cope with ﬁerce competition among production workers and to
maintain the objectivity of promotion criteria. Hence, the signiﬁcant pos-
itive result is comprehensible to some extent. The positive, signiﬁcant im-
pact of d_lathe or d_MC is also quite understandable because most of
these lathes and MCs are the complex CNC machine types, through which
Japanese machine-tool manufacturers attained their current leading posi-
tion in the world market in the early 1980s.21The variable d_Drill indicates
that the ﬁrm is still producing traditional drilling machines, so the signiﬁ-
cant negative impact can be given the opposite interpretation of d_lathe
and d_MC. Only innovative manufacturers that maintained a certain ﬁrm
scale could eﬀectively survive the cutthroat competition among rival pro-
ducers of high-speed and high-precision complex machines. Therefore, the
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on scale100 is reasonable. Lastly, the
negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on d_spoint is quite natural, given that
d_spoint represents a “low price” sales point.
Finally, the last columns in tables 3.1 through 3.3 show each variable’s
impact on the probability that simultaneous information sharing is intro-
duced. Except for the constant (cons) and the skillrat variable, all the inde-
pendent variables are dummies, so the impact is actually equivalent to the
elasticity. In table 3.1, only d_integ and d_tshoot have a large, positive
elasticity. Still, the impact of these variables is at most 0.4. In table 3.2,
however, the number of variables with a large positive impact is much
higher. Furthermore, the magnitudes are far greater than in table 3.1. In-
deed, the following variables have an elasticity greater than 0.5: d_method,
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21. Note that both d_lathe and d_MC are signiﬁcant and positive even in table 2.3.d_mfunc, d_scrape, d_tshoot, d_ptime, d_pubedu, d_lathe, d_MC, and
scale100. These results suggest that simultaneous information-sharing sys-
tems are more likely to be introduced by machine-tool manufacturers that
retain highly skilled assemblyworkers and machinists, produce (CNC)
lathes or MCs, or have more than 100 full-time workers.
3.6 Summary and Conclusion
The Japanese machine-tool industry attained the position of world out-
put leader in 1982 and has maintained this status ever since. This paper an-
alyzes the factors that enabled this success. In this analysis, I assert the
importance of human-related factors in addition to such popular techno-
logical factors as the extensive development of Japanese automakers, the
“leap-forward” development of Japanese mechatronics manufacturers, the
rapid development of precision-parts manufacturers, and the basic devel-
opment of foundry engineering technology. I pay special attention to the
existence of simultaneous and formal information-sharing systems be-
tween production workers and design and development engineers.
My analysis utilizes both ﬁeld research and survey results. The ﬁeld re-
search reveals that the machine-tool industry employs a simultaneous and
rather egalitarian information-sharing system linking production workers
and design and development engineers. It is typically asserted that this
kind of system is indigenous to Japan. However, the ﬁeld research indicates
that these systems have largely been implemented since 1980. I also inves-
tigate why the system was introduced so recently. One promising reason is
that current CNC machines are so complex that, without close collabora-
tion among the various professionals, mechanical designers could not
eﬀectively design machines to the last detail and keep lead times short. This
last conjecture is statistically conﬁrmed by the survey data. Indeed, the sta-
tistical analysis predicts that simultaneous information-sharing systems
are more likely to be implemented by machine-tool manufacturers that re-
tain highly skilled assemblyworkers and machinists, produce (CNC) lathes
or MCs, and have more than 100 full-time workers.
Appendix
Legend
d_sinfo1 A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
answered “yes” to the following question: “Does your
company (or factory) have a formal design review system
in which, even in early stages of machine development,
both R&D (or D&D) engineers and production workers si-
multaneously and directly exchange opinions?”
Shadow Value of Simultaneous Information Sharing 99d_sinfo2 A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if d_sinfo1
= 1 and the ﬁrm introduced this information-sharing sys-
tem in 1980 or later
d_sinfo3 A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if d_sinfo1
= 1 and the system was introduced in 1970 or later
method A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the total
assembly method of high-speed/high-accuracy machines
diﬀers signiﬁcantly from that of other machines
d_integ A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the maker
answered “yes” to the question: “In training your regular
assemblymen, do you basically make them gain broad
skills and know-how for both main- and parts-assembling
processes?”
d_early A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
answered “yes” to the following question: “In order to fos-
ter your prospective leaders, are you concerned about put-
ting talented assemblymen in charge of a wider range of
work beginning in the early stages of their careers, so that
they can gain integrated skills?”
d_mfunc A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
tries to make its machinists multifunctional because this
might allow the machinists to understand the interaction
between the machine tools and the parts they process
d_mfunc2 A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
tries to make its machinists multifunctional because this
might allow the machinists to troubleshoot more eﬀec-
tively
d_scrape A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the most
advanced job for assemblyworkers in the ﬁrm is hand
scraping
d_tshoot A dummy variable that takes on a variable of one if the
most advanced job for assemblyworkers in the ﬁrm is trou-
bleshooting in the shops
skillrat The percentage of (full-time) assemblyworkers that could
fully manage all of the advanced jobs indicated in the ques-
tion
d_ptime A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the man-
ufacturer employs nonregular employees such as part-
timers
d_TQC A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
conducts TQC activities and expects these to lead to a si-
multaneous information-sharing system
d_experi A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if, com-
pared to machining skills, assembling skills are apt to with-
stand rapid technological innovation
100 Hiroyuki Chumaoverseas A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the sam-
pled ﬁrm has directly produced machines overseas using a
production process that is quite diﬀerent from that used for
domestic production
d_intwar A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
was founded during the interwar period
d_pswar A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the maker
was founded after WWII
d_pubedu A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
requires public trade skill licenses for promotion
d_lathe A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
produces (CNC) lathes
d_MC A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
produces MCs
d_Drill A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
produces drilling machines
d_Boring A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
produces boring machines
d_GeaGrd A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
produces gear-cutting machines or grinders
d_IND A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
produces industry machines
d_Misc A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
produces miscellaneous machines
d_spoint A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm’s
sales point is “low price”
d_spoint2 A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm’s
sales point is “high-speed and high-precision machines”
scale100 A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ﬁrm
has more than 100 full-time employees
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